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Abstract
Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games.
We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of
alternatives in analogous fashion. We compare the effect of different voting weights (share-
holdings, party seats, etc.) under plurality, Borda, Copeland, and antiplurality rule. The
number and geometry of weight equivalence classes differ widely across the rules. Decisions
can be much more sensitive to weights in Borda committees than (anti-)plurality or Copeland
ones.
Keywords: group decisions and negotiations · weighted voting · simple games · scoring
rules ·majority rule
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1 Introduction
Consider a corporation of three stockholders owning 6, 5, and 2 million shares.
As collective decisions between CEO candidates, new business proposals, etc. are
taken, votes are weighted by the respective shareholdings. One may wonder: do the
resulting choices differ, ceteris paribus, from those if the three had equal votes? Or,
say, from outcomes for a (48%, 24%, 28%) distribution? The answer affects incentives
to participate in a capital increase or to invest in the first place. Similar questions arise
in international institutions that weight votes by financial contributions or population
sizes (IMF, World Bank, EU Council) or when parties cast bloc votes in parliament.
For binary ‘yes’-or-‘no’ decisions and a simple majority requirement, the above
distributions of weight are equivalent: any two shareholders jointly meet the majority
threshold of 50%; the different weights induce the same winning coalitions, hence
the same binary voting game. This extends to all distributions such that each of three
players wields positive but less than half of total weight. A large literature on simple
voting games has formalized related results.
However, things differ and much less is known if players choose from three
or more options. For instance, the above shareholders may use plurality rule to
decide between three CEO candidates. Then investor 1 is decisive whenever 2 and
3 fail to agree: his or her favorite candidate wins with a tally of 6 : 5 : 2, 11 : 2, or
8 : 5 million. Identical plurality winners would result for (48%, 24%, 28%), but ties
can arise and yield different decisions for equal votes. The former weights define
the same committee game, characterized by n players, m alternatives, and a mapping
from n-tuples of strict preferences to a winning alternative; equal weights create a
different game.
This paper extends several of the – unfortunately, already difficult – questions that
the literature has addressed for binary simple games to committee games. Numerical
tractability falls sharply in m and n but first answers are feasible. Our main interest
lies in equivalence classes of weight distributions for a given group decision rule.
One such class, for instance, comprises all weight vectors that induce the same
plurality winners as (6, 5, 2) for decisions on three alternatives. We investigate three
scoring rules (plurality, Borda, antiplurality) and one Condorcet rule (Copeland).
The respective weight classes can be described by linear inequalities. Monotonicity
properties (Felsenthal and Nurmi 2017), degrees of manipulability (Aleskerov and
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Kurbanov 1999), or strategic voting equilibria (Myerson and Weber 1993; Bouton
2013) for one class member directly apply to all.
Inspired by the ongoing quest of characterizing and counting all simple voting
games that admit a weighted representation,1 we try to determine the number of
distinct weighted committee games involving either plurality, Borda, antiplurality,
or Copeland rule for m ≥ 3 alternatives. We propose a decisive test, based on
integer linear programming, for whether a given choice rule is representable as a
weighted instance of a given scoring rule. The superexponential number of m(m! n)
distinct mappings from n-tuples of preferences to m potential winners makes the
analysis computationally difficult. Still, minimal representations are provided for all
51 Borda committee games with n = m = 3, all plurality and antiplurality committees
with n ≤ 4, and all Copeland committees with n ≤ 6 players in the appendix; others
are available upon request. Complete enumeration and lists of games can be useful,
e.g., to solve the ‘inverse problem’ of finding a voting game that best achieves a given
goal (Kurz 2012b) or to obtain sharp bounds on numbers of players and alternatives
that permit a certain monotonicity violation, voting paradox, etc.
The extent to which different voting weights make a real or only a superficial
difference has practical relevance. For example, financial drawing rights and thereby
voting weights among the 24 Directors of the International Monetary Fund’s Exec-
utive Board were reformed in 2016. Has the vote change been purely cosmetic or
is it possible that the agreed weight increases for emerging market economies affect
future decisions, such as the choice of the next IMF Managing Director? The selection
process for the latter has been reformed too and involves a shortlist of three candi-
dates that is compiled “taking into account the Fund’s weighted voting system”.2
The winner is chosen by consensus or else determined “by a majority of the votes
cast” according to the new voting powers. The IMF’s weighted voting system would
be compatible with pairwise majority comparisons of candidates (Copeland rule) as
well as plurality votes in the shortlisting and runoff stages; in the former, use of a
scoring method such as Borda rule is conceivable too. Whether different procedural
choices at either stage might have an effect and whether the 2016 vote changes could
matter for outcomes both boil down to equivalence or not of weighted committee
1See the monograph by Taylor and Zwicker (1999) and, e.g., Kurz (2012a), Houy and Zwicker
(2014), or Freixas et al. (2017). The number of weighted voting games is still unknown for n > 9.
2Cf. www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Managing-Director-Selection-Process/qandas (last ac-
cessed: August 12, 2019).
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games.
We depict the geometry of weighted committees for n = 3. The illustrations
convey a sense of the (non-)robustness of collective decisions with respect to varia-
tions in voting weights that reflect, e.g., changes in corporate voting rights or party
switching in parliament. Borda rule can be seen to be highly sensitive to weight
variations while collective choice by (anti-)plurality or Copeland rule generates only
muted incentives for increasing votes to gain influence on decisions.
2 Notation and definitions
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a finite set N of n ≥ 1 players such that each i ∈ N has a strict preference
relation Pi over a set A = {a1, . . . , am} of m ≥ 2 alternatives. P(A) denotes the set of all
m! strict preference orderings on A. A collective choice rule ρ : P(A)n → A maps each
profile P = (P1, . . . ,Pn) to a winning alternative a∗ = ρ(P). Though ρ is defined on
complete preference profiles P, it might draw on partial preference information only
and require players, e.g., to submit just the top elements of P1, . . . ,Pn in a plurality
vote. Note also that ρ does not specify information on how non-winning alternatives
a , a∗ are ranked relative to each other: we investigate resolute (singleton-valued)
choice rules rather than Arrovian social welfare functions.
Rules ρ that treat all voters i ∈ N symmetrically play a special role in our analysis:
suppose profile P′ = (Ppi(1), . . . ,Ppi(n)) results from applying a permutation pi : N → N
to P. Then ρ is anonymous if ρ(P) = ρ(P′) for all such P, P′. We write r instead of ρ if
we want to highlight that a considered rule is anonymous.
We focus on four standard voting rules. Their definitions are summarized in
Table 1 where bi(a,P) := |{a′ ∈ A | aPia′}|. Antiplurality rule rA, Borda rule rB, and
plurality rule rP are scoring rules: winners can be characterized as maximizers of
scores derived from alternatives’ positions in P and a fixed scoring vector s ∈ Zm with
s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm. Namely, let the fact that alternative a is ranked at the j-th highest
position in ordering Pi contribute s j points for a, and refer to the sum of all points
received as a’s score. Then score maximization for sB = (m − 1,m − 2, . . . , 1, 0) yields
the Borda winner, sP = (1, 0, . . . , 0, 0) the plurality winner, and sA = (0, 0, . . . , 0,−1) or
(1, 1, . . . , 1, 0) the antiplurality winner. By contrast, Copeland rule rC considers the
3
Rule Winning alternative at preference profile P
Antiplurality rA(P) ∈ arg mina∈A
∣∣∣{i ∈ N | ∀a′ , a ∈ A : a′Pia}∣∣∣
Borda rB(P) ∈ arg maxa∈A
∑
i∈N bi(a,P)
Copeland rC(P) ∈ arg maxa∈A
∣∣∣{a′ ∈ A | a PM a′}∣∣∣
Plurality rP(P) ∈ arg maxa∈A
∣∣∣{i ∈ N | ∀a′ , a ∈ A : aPia′}∣∣∣
Table 1: Investigated voting rules
pairwise majority relation a PM a′ :⇔
∣∣∣{i ∈ N | aPia′}∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣{i ∈ N | a′Pia}∣∣∣ and selects the
alternative that beats the most others according to PM. Clearly, if PM has a unique
top – the Condorcet winner – then it will be chosen: that is, rC is a Condorcet method.
We impose lexicographic tie breaking. This has computational advantages over
working with set-valued choices and entails no loss provided we consider all P ∈
P(A)n: the set of alternatives tied at P is fully determined by a∗ = r(P) and the respec-
tive winners a∗∗, a∗∗∗, . . . at profiles P′,P′′, . . . that swap a∗ with alternatives a′, a′′, . . .
that might be tied with a∗ at P.3 Our resolute rules rA, rB, rC, rP and their set-valued
versions are hence in one-to-one correspondence and exhibit identical structural
equivalences. The same applies to uniform random tie breaking.
We call the combination (N,A, ρ) of a set of voters, a set of alternatives and a
collective choice rule a committee game or just a committee. Several special cases have
previously received attention in the literature.
Most prominently, committees (N,A, ρ) with binary A = {0, 1} and surjective,
monotonic ρ are known as simple voting games. Following von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1953, Ch. 10), these games are usually described as a pair (N, v) with
v : 2N → {0, 1} and v(S) = 1 when 1 Pi 0 for all i ∈ S implies ρ(P) = 1. Sets S ⊆ N with
v(S) = 1 are known as winning coalitions. (N, v) is weighted and called weighted voting
game if there exists a non-negative vector w = (w1, . . . ,wn) of weights and a positive
quota q such that v(S) = 1 if and only if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q.4 Pair (q; w) is a (weighted) represen-
tation of (N, v) and one writes (N, v) = [q; w]. It is no restriction to focus on integers:
given q ∈ R++, w ∈ Rn+ there always exist q′ ∈N, w′ ∈Nn0 such that [q; w] = [q′; w′].
3Given r(P) = b, for example, a tie with a can directly be ruled out; one sees if b was tied with c by
checking whether r(P′) = c or b where P′ only swaps b’s and c’s position in every player’s ranking Pi.
4 Existence is guaranteed only for n ≤ 3. Games that are not weighted arise, e.g., in the Legislative
Council of Hong Kong (Cheung and Ng 2014) and the EU Council (Kurz and Napel 2016).
4
Other special cases include voting with multiple levels of approval, such as ternary
voting games (Felsenthal and Machover 1997), quaternary voting games (Laruelle and
Valenciano 2012), and ( j, k)-games (Hsiao and Raghavan 1993; Freixas and Zwicker
2003). Plurality committees (defined below) have featured in the multicandidate vot-
ing frameworks of Bolger (1983), Amer et al. (1998) and Monroy and Ferna´ndez (2009,
2011) as simple plurality games and relative majority r-games.5
2.2 Weighted committee games
Many committee games that model real collective decision making involve a non-
anonymous rule ρ. For instance, an anonymous decision rule r may apply at the
level of shareholdings, IMF drawing rights, etc. rather than that of individual voters;
or players i ∈ N are well-disciplined parties with different numbers of seats.6 The
corresponding rule ρ can be viewed as the combination of an anonymous collective choice
rule r with integer voting weights w1, . . . ,wn attached to the players.
With r denoting the entire family of mappings from n-tuples of linear orders over
A to winners a∗ ∈ A under the considered rule, we define r|w : P(A)wΣ → A by
r|w(P) := r(P1, . . . ,P1︸     ︷︷     ︸
w1 times
, P2, . . . ,P2︸     ︷︷     ︸
w2 times
, . . . , Pn, . . . ,Pn︸     ︷︷     ︸
wn times
) (1)
for a given anonymous rule r and a non-negative, non-degenerate weight vector
w = (w1, . . . ,wn) ∈ Nn0 with wΣ :=
∑n
i=1 wi > 0. In the degenerate case w = (0, . . . , 0),
let r|0(P) ≡ a1.
We say a committee game (N,A, ρ) is r-weighted for a given rule r if there exists a
weight vector w = (w1, . . . ,wn) ∈Nn0 such that (N,A, ρ) = (N,A, r|w), i.e.,
ρ(P) = r|w(P) for all P = (P1, . . . ,Pn) ∈ P(A)n. (2)
(N,A, r,w) is a (weighted) representation of (N,A, ρ) and we also denote this game by
[N,A, r,w]. [N,A, rA,w], [N,A, rB,w], [N,A, rC,w] and [N,A, rP,w] are referred to as
5 Their analysis focused on power indices. We here show that there are only 36 distinct simple
plurality games with four players and so at most 36 different distributions of power can arise.
6 If designated members enjoy procedural privileges, this may – but need not – be equivalent to
asymmetric weights. Veto power of permanent members in the UN Security Council, e.g., translates
into [39; 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 1, . . . , 1] for m = 2.
5
P1 P2 P3 P4
d b c c
e c e b
b e a a
a a d d
c d b e
⇒
rA|w(P) = a (a has min. negative votes 0)
rB|w(P) = b (b has max. Borda score 28)
rC|w(P) = c (c has max. pairwise wins 3)
rP|w(P) = d (d has max. plurality tally 5)
Table 2: Choices for preference profile P when w = (5, 3, 2, 2)
antiplurality, Borda, Copeland and plurality committees respectively. Such committees
typically differ for m > 2, as illustrated in Table 2: the winner from A = {a, b, c, d, e} at
P all depends on the voting rule in use. Neither this observation nor below structural
findings depend on whether P reflects sincere or strategic preference statements.
By definition (1) uniform weights w = (1, . . . , 1) reduce any collective choice
rule r|w to r. It follows that monotonicity, consistency, and other properties that
are satisfied (violated) by a given rule r are also satisfied (violated) by r|w. For
instance, the axiomatic characterizations by Young (1975) of set-valued versions of
general scoring rules, Henriet (1985) of a Copeland variation, or Kurihara (2018)
of antiplurality continue to apply. Non-uniform weights w essentially impose the
domain restriction that w1, w2, . . . individuals have identical preferences. At a given
profile P, a group i of voters can be worse off under r|w′ than r|w for w′i > wi and
w′j = w j, j , i, if and only if r suffers from the so-called no show paradox. Condorcet
methods like Copeland rule are known to do so (see Moulin 1988), while scoring
rules do not. Our question here is related but a broader one: for given r, which
weight variations w′ , w can or cannot induce choice changes compared to r|w?
3 Equivalence classes of weighted committee games
3.1 Equivalence of committee games
Two r-weighted committee games (N,A, r|w) and (N′,A′, r|w′) are structurally equiva-
lent or equivalent up to isomorphism if{
a j Pi ak ⇔ p˜i(a j) P′pi(i) p˜i(ak)
}
⇒ p˜i
(
r|w(P)
)
= r|w′(P′) (3)
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for bijections pi : N → N′ and p˜i : A → A′ that map every profile P of preferences Pi
over A to a relabeled profile P′ of preferences P′pi(i) over A
′.7 For instance, Copeland
committees with N = N′ = {1, 2, 3}, A = A′, w = (3, 1, 1) and w′ = (1, 3, 1) have quite
different attractiveness to player 1 but the decision environment is structurally the
same: there is a dictator player whose most-preferred alternative wins and two null
players whose preferences do not affect the outcome.
A given distribution w ∈ Nn0 fixes n and we can write (r,w) ∼m (r,w′) if r-
committee games with m alternatives are structurally equivalent for weights w and
w′. Relation ∼m and some w¯ ∈Nn0 with w¯1 ≥ w¯2 ≥ . . . ≥ w¯n define the equivalence class
Erw¯,m :=
{
w ∈Nn0 | (r,w) ∼m (r, w¯)
}
. (4)
If rule r is in use for deciding between m alternatives, then all weight distributions
w,w′ ∈ Erw¯,m come with identical monotonicity properties, voting paradoxes, manip-
ulation incentives, implementation possibilities, strategic equilibria, etc.
3.2 Illustration
As an example, consider Borda rule for m = 3 and reference weights w¯ = (5, 2, 1)
that reflect a given seat distribution in a council, voting stocks held by shareholders,
etc. We focus on the subset EB(5,2,1),3 ⊂ Er
B
(5,2,1),3 of alternative distributions w with
w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3. Two linear inequalities are implied by rB|(5, 2, 1) = rB|w for each profile
P ∈ P(A)3. For instance, writing abc in abbreviation of aPibPic, profile P = (cab, bac, abc)
gives rise to a total Borda score w¯1 · 1 + w¯2 · 1 + w¯3 · 2 = 9 for alternative a: it is ranked
top by player 3, middle by players 1 and 2. The corresponding scores for b and c
are 2w¯2 + w¯3 = 5 and 2w¯1 = 10. Hence rB|w¯(P) = c and any allocation w of seats,
shares, etc. that is equivalent to w¯ must ensure that the respective Borda score 2w1 of
(lexicograpically maximal) c strictly exceeds a’s and b’s scores:
(I) 2w1 > w1 + w2 + 2w3 and (II) 2w1 > 2w2 + w3.
7Analogous equivalences apply to (N,A, r|w) and (N′,A′, r′|w′) when r , r′ or general committees
(N,A, ρ) and (N′,A′, ρ′). The respective considerations could, in principle, also be extended to Arrovian
social welfare functions, which map each profile of individual preferences to a collective preference
P∗ ∈ P(A) rather than a winning alternative a∗ ∈ A. We leave detailed explorations to future research.
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P′ = (cab, abc, bac) makes a the winner. Its score must not be smaller than b’s and c’s:
(III) w1 + 2w2 + w3 ≥ w2 + 2w3 and (IV) w1 + 2w2 + w3 ≥ 2w1.
Wins by a and b for P′′ = (abc, bca, bac) and P′′′ = (abc, bca, bca) similarly imply:
(V) 2w1 + w3 ≥ w1 + 2w2 + 2w3 and (VI) 2w1 + w3 ≥ w2
(VII) w1 + 2w2 + 2w3 > 2w1 and (VIII) w1 + 2w2 + 2w3 ≥ w2 + w3.
Condition (VIII) is trivially satisfied. (IV) and (V) imply w1 = 2w2 +w3. This makes (I)
equivalent to w2 > w3 and (VII) to w3 > 0. Combining w1 = 2w2 + w3 and w2 > w3 > 0
also verifies (II), (III) and (VI). The 212 remaining profiles P ∈ P(A)3 turn out not to
impose additional constraints. Hence
w ∈ EB(5,2,1),3 =
{
(2w2 + w3,w2,w3) ∈N30 : w2 > w3 > 0
}
(5)
contains all weight distributions w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3 that imply Borda choices identical to
w¯ = (5, 2, 1) for all preference profiles over three options. The full classErB(5,2,1),3 follows
by permuting the distributions in EB(5,2,1),3. Other classes, such as Er
B
(1,1,1),3, Er
B
(2,1,1),3, etc.,
are characterized by analogous inequalities.
3.3 Relation between equivalence classes
The number of distinct mappings from preference profiles to outcomes is large but
finite for given n and m. Nn0 hence is partitioned into a finite collection
{
Erw¯1,m,Erw¯2,m,
. . . ,Erw¯ξ,m
}
for any given rule r. We will investigate numerically how the number ξ of
elements varies across rules but let us first state some analytical observations. The
first two are obvious:
Proposition 1. The partitions
{
Erw¯1,2, . . . ,Erw¯ξ,2
}
ofNn0 coincide for r ∈ {rA, rB, rC, rP}.
Proposition 2. Let A = {a1, a2} and r ∈ {rA, rB, rC, rP}. Then r|w(P) = a1 ⇔ v(S) = 1 where
(N, v) = [q; w] with q = 12
∑
i∈N wi and S = {i ∈ N | a1 Pi a2}.
It follows that the respective partitions
{
Erw¯1,2, . . . ,Erw¯ξ,2
}
ofNn0 coincide with those for
weighted voting games with a simple majority quota. Their study and enumeration
for n ≤ 5 dates back to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, Ch. 10).
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The next observations vary m for fixed r; proofs are given in Appendix A:
Proposition 3. The antiplurality partitions
{
ErAw¯1,m,Er
A
w¯2,m, . . . ,Er
A
w¯ξ,m
}
of Nn0 r {0} con-
sist of ξ = n equivalence classes identified by weight vectors w¯1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), w¯2 =
(1, 1, . . . , 0), . . . , w¯n = (1, 1, . . . , 1) for all m ≥ n + 1.
Proposition 4. For Borda rule rB and m ≥ 3, every weight vector w˜j = ( j, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} identifies a different class ErBw˜j,m.
This implies that – differently from antiplurality, Copeland, and plurality – the num-
ber ξ of structurally distinct Borda committee games for given n ≥ 3 grows in m
without bound.
Proposition 5. The Copeland partitions
{
ErCw¯1,m, . . . ,Er
C
w¯ξ,m
}
ofNn0 coincide for all m ≥ 2.
So rC extends the known equivalences for binary simple voting games to arbitrarily
many options. This might feel unsurprising because winners in Copeland commit-
tees are selected by binary comparisons.
However, the conjecture that Prop. 5 applies to just any Condorcet method is
wrong. Copeland rule is special. For instance, Black rule selects the Condorcet
winner if one exists and otherwise breaks cyclical majorities by Borda scores. Weight
distributions of (6, 4, 3) and (4, 4, 2) are equivalent for m = 2 and give rise to a cycle
a PM b PM c PM a for P = (cab, abc, bca). The Black winner then is c for the former
but a for the latter weights; so they are non-equivalent for m = 3. The same applies
to Kemeny–Young or maximum likelihood rule, which picks the top element of the
collective preference ranking P∗ that minimizes total pairwise disagreements with all
individual rankings in P; or maximin rule, where the winner maximizes the minimum
support across all pairwise comparisons.
Proposition 6. The plurality partitions
{
ErPw¯1,m, . . . ,Er
P
w¯ξ,m
}
ofNn0 coincide for all m ≥ n.
4 Identification of weighted committees
4.1 Minimal representations and test for weightedness
Given (N,A, ρ) = (N,A, r|w), we say that (N,A, r,w) has minimum integer sum or
is a minimal representation of (N,A, ρ) if
∑
i∈N w′i ≥
∑
i∈N wi for all representations
9
(N,A, r,w′) of (N,A, ρ). Games in a given equivalence class Erw¯,m usually have a
unique minimal representation;8 corresponding weights are a focal choice for w¯.
Minimal representations can be more informative or convenient to work with than
given weights in applications (cf. Freixas and Kaniovski 2014, Kurz and Napel 2016).
Finding minimal representations of all Copeland committees simplifies to finding
weighted representations of simple voting games (Prop. 2 and 5). Linear program-
ming techniques have proven useful there and can be adapted to scoring rules rA,
rB, or rP. Namely, consider a scoring rule r based on an arbitrary but fixed scoring
vector s. Write Sk(Pi) ∈ Z for the unweighted (s1, s2, . . . , sm)-score of alternative ak
derived from its position in ordering Pi; for instance, for m = 3 and a3 = c, we have
S3(Pi) = s2 if either aPicPib or bPicPia. Now suppose that r can be combined with
integer voting weights so as to induce choice rule ρ. Then – denoting the index of
the winning alternative at profile P by ωρ(P) ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, i.e., ρ(P) = aωρ(P) ∈ A –
any solution to the following integer linear program yields a minimal representation
(N,A, r,w) of (N,A, ρ):
min
w∈Nn0
n∑
i=1
wi (ILP)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
Sk(Pi) · wi ≤
n∑
i=1
Sωρ(P)(Pi) · wi − 1 ∀P ∈ P(A)n ∀1 ≤ k ≤ ωρ(P) − 1,
n∑
i=1
Sk(Pi) · wi ≤
n∑
i=1
Sωρ(P)(Pi) · wi ∀P ∈ P(A)n ∀ωρ(P) + 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
The case distinction between alternatives ak with index k < ωρ(P) vs. k > ωρ(P) reflects
the tie breaking assumption. If some (non-minimal) representation (N,A, r,w′) of
(N,A, ρ) is known and w′1 ≥ w′2 ≥ . . . ≥ w′n then adding constraints wi ≥ wi+1,∀1 ≤ i ≤
n − 1, to (ILP) accelerates computations.
If it is not known whether ρ is r-weighted, (ILP) provides a decisive test for r-
weightedness for any given scoring rule r (and rC by Prop. 1 and 5): the constraints
characterize a non-empty compact set if and only if ρ is r-weighted. Checking non-
emptiness of (ILP)’s constraint set can be done with software (e.g., Gurobi or CPLEX)
that determines a weight sum minimizer at little extra effort.
8For m = 2, minimal representations are unique up to n = 7 players (Kurz 2012a). Multiplicities
for games with larger values of m or n arise but are rare.
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Branch-and-Cut Algorithm
Given n, m and r, identify every class Erw¯k,m by a minimal representation.
Step 1 Generate all J := (m!)n profiles P1, . . . ,PJ ∈ P(A)n for A := {a1, . . . , am}.
Set F := ∅.
Step 2 For every P j ∈ P(A)n and every ai ∈ A, check if there is any weight
vector w ∈ Nn0 s.t. r|w(P j) = ai by testing feasibility of the implied
constraints (cf. Section 3.2). If yes, then append (i, j) to F .
Step 3 Loop over j from 1 to J.
Step 3a If j = 1, then set C1 := {1 ≤ i ≤ m | (i, j) ∈ F }.
Step 3b If j ≥ 2, then set C j := ∅ and loop over all (p1, . . . , p j−1) ∈ C j−1 and
all p j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with (p j, j) ∈ F . If (ILP) has a solution for the
restriction to the profiles P1, . . . ,Pj with prescribed winners ρ(Pi) =
api for 1 ≤ i ≤ j, then append (p1, . . . , p j) to Cp.
Step 4 Loop over the elements (p1, . . . , p j, . . . , pJ) ∈ CJ and output minimal
weights w¯ such that r|w¯ ≡ ρ with ρ(Pj) = p j by solving (ILP).
Table 3: Determining the classes of r-weighted committees for given n and m
4.2 Algorithm for identifying all r-committees
In principle, one could find and characterize all distinct r-committee games for fixed
n and m as follows: loop over all m(m!n) mappings ρ : P(A)n → A; conduct above test;
in case of success, determine a representation (N,A, r, w¯) and characterize Erw¯,m as in
Section 3.2; continue until all choice rules ρ have been covered.
The explosive growth of m(m!n) prevents a direct implementation of this idea.9
However, many mappings can be dropped from consideration. If ρ(P) = a1 for one
of the (m − 1)!n profiles P where a1 is unanimously ranked last, for instance, then ρ
cannot be r-weighted for r ∈ {rA, rB, rC, rP}. This rules out m(m!n−1) candidate mappings
in one go. Similarly, if weights w such that r|w(P) = a1 turn out to be incompatible
with r|w(P′) = a2 for two suitable profiles P,P′, then all m(m!n−2) mappings ρ with
ρ(P) = a1 and ρ(P′) = a2 can be disregarded at once. The branch-and-cut algorithm
described in Table 3 operationalizes these considerations.
The algorithm can still require impractical memory size and running time. The
main alternative then is to heuristically loop over different weight distributions and
check if they are structurally distinct from those already known. Namely, start with
93(3!
3) = 3216 > 10103 already exceeds the estimated number of atoms in the universe.
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wΣ := 0 and an empty list Wˆ of weight vectors; increase the sum of weights wΣ in
steps of 1; generate the setWwΣ :=
{
w ∈ Nn0
∣∣∣ w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn and w1 + · · · + wn = wΣ}
and loop over all w ∈ WwΣ . The respective weight vector w is appended to Wˆ if for
every w′ ∈ Wˆ we have r|w(P) , r|w′(P) for at least one P ∈ P(A)n. The set Wˆ then
contains a growing list of minimal weight vectors that induce different mappings
from preference profiles to winners and hence correspond to structurally distinct
committee games [N,A, r,w]. This method has the advantage of not requiring a
weightedness test, such as (ILP). However, search needs to be stopped manually and
just produces a lower bound on the actual number of classes.10
5 Number and geometry of weighted committee games
5.1 Number of antiplurality, Borda, Copeland, and plurality games
A combination of our analytical observations and computational means permits iden-
tification of all structurally distinct r-weighted committee games with r ∈ {rA, rB, rC, rP}
for small n and m. Table 4 summarizes our findings; figures do not includeE0,m.11 The
branch-and-cut approach required excessive memory for Borda committees when
m > 4 or n = m ≥ 4.12 We write “≥ . . .” if the heuristic appended no new games to
set Wˆ for long enough to support the conjecture that the reported bound equals the
exact number of games; we write “ . . .” otherwise.
Figures for m = 2 and n ≤ 6 have been obtained in the literature before; the
others are, to our knowledge, new. When less than 150 equivalence classes of games
exist, we report minimal representations in Appendix B. Our list for m = 2 nests
the weighted voting games with 50%-majority threshold reported by Krohn and
Sudho¨lter (1995) and Brams and Fishburn (1996); plurality committees with m = 3
nest the subset of tie-free games identified by Chua et al. (2002) for n = 3, 4.
10Upper bounds exist for weight sums that guarantee coverage of all equivalence classes (cf. Muroga
1971, Thm. 9.3.2.1). The bounds are too large to be practical, however.
11w0 = 0 always forms its own equivalence class: consider the unanimous profile P = (P, . . . ,P) ∈
P(A)n with a2Pa3P . . .PamPa1. Then r|0(P) = a1 but r|w(P) = a2 for any w , 0.
12We used 128 GB RAM and eight 3.0 GHz cores. Several instances ran for more than six months.
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n,m
r Antiplurality Borda Copeland Plurality
3,2 4
4,2 9
5,2 27
6,2 138
7,2 1 663
8,2 63 764
9,2 9 425 479
3, 3 5 51 4 6
3, 4 3 505 4 6
3, 5 3 ≥ 2 251 4 6
4, 3 19 5 255 9 34
4, 4 7  635 622 9 36
4, 5 4  635 622 9 36
5, 3 263  1 153 448 27 852
6, 3 ≥ 33 583  1 153 448 138  147 984
Table 4: Numbers of distinct weighted committee games
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(a) (b)
1 2
3
(1,0,0)
(2,1,1)
(1,1,1)
(1,1,0)
1 2
3
(1,1,1)
(2,1,2)
(2,1,1)
(1,1,0)
(1,0,0)
(3,2,2)
Figure 1: The four Copeland and six plurality equivalence classes
5.2 Geometry of committee games with n=3
The case of three players allows to convey a geometric idea of how robust a given
weighted committee is to small changes in weights. Our illustrations echo those by
Saari (1995, 2001): his eponymous triangles concern m = 3 alternatives and arbitrary
numbers n of individual voters. They illuminate how collective rankings vary with
the applicable voting procedure for fixed preferences P. We, by contrast, assume n = 3
voter blocs, evaluate all preferences, and the number m of alternatives may vary. We
use the standard projection of the 3-dimensional unit simplex of relative weights
to the plane. Points of identical color correspond to structurally equivalent weight
distributions, i.e., they induce isomorphic committee games for the investigated
voting rule r. When equivalence classes are line segments or single points, we have
manually enlarged them in Figures 1 and 2 to improve visibility.
Figure 1(a) shows all Copeland committees with three players and their minimal
representations. Very dissimilar weight distributions like (33, 33, 33) and (49, 49, 1)
induce the same Copeland winners. Figure 1(b) illustrates that plurality rule is more
sensitive to weight perturbations than Copeland rule, at least for non-dictatorial
configurations. This is more pronounced the more voter blocs are involved: there
are about four and 32 times more distinct committees with plurality than Copeland
rule for n = 4 and 5 (Table 4); we conjecture the factor exceeds 1 000 for n = 6.
Antiplurality rule (Figure 2), characterized recently with new axioms by Kurihara
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(a) m = 3 (b) m ≥ 4
1 2
3
(1,0,0)
(2,1,1)
(1,1,0)
(2,2,1)
(1,1,1)
1 2
3
(1,1,1)
(1,0,0) (1,1,0)
Figure 2: The five or three antiplurality equivalence classes
(2018), holds an intermediate ground in terms of the sensitivity to w. The most scope
for changes in the distribution of voting rights to induce different decisions comes
with Borda rule, as illustrated by Figure 3. (Note that Figure 1(a) captures the case
of m = 2 for rA, rB, and rP, too.) Whether such sensitivity is (un)desirable from an
institutional perspective will depend on context and objectives. Higher sensitivity
can give bigger incentives for political parties to campaign or private investment
in voting stock. However, this needs to be weighed against other properties of a
voting method such as consistency with respect to subgroup decisions (Young 1975),
informational requirements, or complexity of strategic manipulation.
6 Concluding remarks
Equivalence of seemingly different distributions of seats, quotas, voting stock, etc.
depends highly on whether decisions involve two, three, or more alternatives. Weight
distributions such as (6, 5, 2), (1, 1, 1), or (48%, 24%, 28%) induce the same binary
majority choices and Copeland decisions but lead to non-equivalent mappings from
preferences to selected alternatives in other cases. The respective potential for weight
differences to matter has been formalized and compared here. The investigated
equivalences and their voting power implications (see Kurz et al. 2019) could be of
interest not only for multicandidate voting in corporations, councils, or parliaments;
e.g., acceptable polling error should be larger in the middle of an equivalence class
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(a) m = 3
1 2
3
(b) m = 4 (c) m = 5
1 2
3
1 2
3
Figure 3: The 51, 505, and ≥2251 Borda equivalence classes
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of an election rule than on its boundary.
For the IMF’s Executive Board, we have checked that the 2016 reform of drawing
rights can have consequences for who becomes the next IMF Managing Director.
Election winners differ between reformed and unreformed weights for about 5% of
all 624 conceivable strict preference configurations over three shortlisted candidates.
It matters for almost 15% of profiles whether Copeland or plurality rule is applied.
There is ample choice for extending above analysis since the list of single-winner
voting procedures used by committees is long (see, e.g., Laslier 2012). We have
tentatively considered scoring rules with arbitrary s = (1, s2, 0) ∈ Q3 for n = m = 3,
too. The numbers of distinct committees are M-shaped: they increase from 6 for
plurality to more than 160 for s2 = 0.25, fall to 51 Borda committees for s2 = 0.5,
increase again to at least 229 for s2 = 0.9 and then drop to 5 antiplurality committees.
Implications of different weights are, obviously, just one aspect of preference
aggregation by voting among others (cf. Nurmi 1987). Group decisions may often
be purely binary affairs and the fast-growing dimensionality of collective choice
makes it challenging to evaluate weighted voting for m ≥ 3. Table 4 and Figures 1–3
document how non-trivial the links between weight and choice differences can be.
They seem relevant enough, however, to be studied beyond the binary case.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3
The claim is obvious for n = 1. So consider m ≥ n + 1 for n ≥ 2. Let A = {a1, . . . , am} and
Pi ∈ P(A)n be any preference profile where the first i players rank alternative a1 last and the
remaining n − i players rank alternative a2 last. Consider any w¯k and w¯l with k < l. Then
rA|w¯k(Pk) = a2 , rA|w¯l(Pk) = a3. So ErAw¯1,m,Er
A
w¯2,m, . . . ,Er
A
w¯n,m all differ.
Now assume w ∈ Nn0 r {0} with w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . ≥ wn satisfies (rA,w) /m (rA, w¯k) for all
k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Let l denote the index such that wl > 0 and wl+1 = 0. Then both rA|w(P) and
rA|w¯l(P) equal the lexicographically minimal element in Zl(P) :=
{
a ∈ A | ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l} : ∃a′ ∈
A : aPia′
}
, which collects all alternatives not ranked last by any of the players who have
positive weight. These coincide for w and w¯l; and Zl(P) is non-empty because m ≥ n + 1.
This holds for arbitrary P ∈ P(A)n. Hence rA|w ≡ rA|w¯l, contradicting the assumption
that (rA,w) /m (rA, w¯k) for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Consequently, ErAw¯1,m,Er
A
w¯2,m, . . . ,Er
A
w¯n,m are all
antiplurality classes that exist for m ≥ n + 1 (plus the degenerate E0,m).
Proof of Proposition 4
Let k > j for otherwise arbitrary j, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and consider any profile P ∈ P(A)n such
that a2 P1 a1 P1 a3 P1 a4 . . . am and a1 P2 a3 P2 a4 . . . ak P2 a2 P2 ak+1 P2 ak+2 . . . am. The Borda score
j · (m−2)+ (m−1) of a1 under w˜j is at least as big as the corresponding score j · (m−1)+ (m− k)
of a2. Since scores of a3, . . . , am are all strictly smaller than that of a1, we have rB|w˜j(P) = a1.
With w˜k, by contrast, a1’s weighted score k · (m − 2) + (m − 1) is strictly smaller than a2’s
corresponding score k · (m − 1) + (m − k). Scores of a3, . . . , am remain smaller than a1’s. So
rB|w˜k(P) = a2. Hence (rB, w˜j) /m (rB, w˜k).
Proof of Proposition 5
For a given set A = {a1, . . . , am} and any subset A′ ⊆ A that preserves the order of the
alternatives, denote the projection of preference profile P ∈ P(A)n to A′ by P↓A′ with ak Pi↓A′
al :⇔ [akPial and ak, al ∈ A′]. Conversely, if A′ ⊇ A is a superset of A with A′ r A =
{am+1, . . . , am′} define the lifting P↑A′ of P ∈ P(A)n to A′ by appending alternatives am+1, . . . , am′
to each ordering Pi below the lowest-ranked alternative from A.
Now consider m > 2 and w,w′ ∈ Nn0 such that (rC,w) /m (rC,w′), i.e., rC|w(P) , rC|w′(P)
for some P ∈ P(A)n. The w and w′-weighted versions of the majority relation must differ at
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P. W.l.o.g. let weak victory of ak over al for w turn into a strict victory of al over ak for w′:∑
i : akPial
wi ≥
∑
j : alP jak
w j and
∑
i : akPial
w′i <
∑
j : alP jak
w′j. (6)
Then take A′ = {ak, al} ⊂ A where |A′| = 2 and projection P↓A′ . (6) implies∑
i : ak Pi↓A′ al
wi ≥
∑
j : al P j↓A′ ak
w j and
∑
i : ak Pi↓A′ al
w′i <
∑
j : al P j↓A′ ak
w′j. (7)
If both inequalities are strict or k < l then rC|w(P↓A′) = ak , rC|w′(P↓A′) = al and hence
(rC,w) /2 (rC,w′). If not, al wins also for w by lexicographic tie breaking but we can consider
profile P′ ∈ P(A′)n with alP′i ak ⇔ akPi↓A′ al for all i ∈ N. Then rC|w(P′) = al , rC|w′(P′) = ak
and (rC,w) /2 (rC,w′).
Conversely take A = {a1, a2} and w,w′ ∈ Nn0 such that (rC,w) /2 (rC,w′) and rC|w(P) =
a1 , rC|w′(P) = a2 for some P ∈ P(A)n. Then∑
i : a1Pia2
wi ≥
∑
j : a2P ja1
w j and
∑
i : a1Pia2
w′i <
∑
j : a2P ja1
w′j. (8)
Consider A′ = {a1, a2, . . . , am} ⊃ A where |A′| = m and lifting P↑A′ . (8) implies∑
i : a1 Pi↑A′a2
wi ≥
∑
j : a2 P j↑A′a1
w j and
∑
i : a1 Pi↑A′a2
w′i <
∑
j : a2 P j↑A′a1
w′j (9)
and alternatives a3, . . . , am lose all weighted majority comparisons against a1 and a2 by con-
struction of P↑A′ . So rC|w(P↑A′) = a1 , rC|w′(P↑A′) = a2. Hence (rC,w) /m (rC,w′). In
summary, (rC,w) /2 (rC,w′) ⇔ (rC,w) /m (rC,w′) and, a fortiori, (rC,w) ∼2 (rC,w′) ⇔
(rC,w) ∼m (rC,w′).
Proof of Proposition 6
Let m > n. Consider A = {a1, . . . , am} and any w,w′ ∈Nn0 such that (rP,w) /m (rP,w′). So there
exists P ∈ P(A)n with rP|w(P) = ak , rP|w′(P) = al. For this P let Aˆ :=
{
a | ∃i ∈ N : ∀a′ , a : aPia′
}
denote the set of all alternatives that are top-ranked by some voter. (Obviously, ak, al ∈ Aˆ.)
Now define A′ ⊂ A as the union of Aˆ and some arbitrary elements of Ar Aˆ such that |A′| = n.
By construction, each a ∈ A′ has the same weighted number of top positions for projection
P↓A′ as it had for P. So rP|w(P↓A′) = ak , rP|w′(P↓A′) = al. Hence (rP,w) /n (rP,w′).
Analogously, consider A = {a1, . . . , an} and w,w′ ∈ Nn0 such that (rP,w) /n (rP,w′). A
profile P ∈ P(A)n with rP|w(P) = ak , rP|w′(P) = al can then be lifted to A′ = A∪{an+1, . . . , am}.
By construction, rP|w(P↑A′) = ak , rP|w′(P↑A′) = al. Hence (rP,w) /m (rP,w′). Overall, we
can conclude (rP,w) ∼m (rP,w′)⇔ (rP,w) ∼n (rP,w′).
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Appendix B: Minimal representations of committees
n,m Minimal w¯ for all antiplurality classes ErAw¯,m
3, 3 1. (1,0,0) 3. (1,1,1) 5. (2,2,1)
2. (1,1,0) 4. (2,1,1)
3,m ≥ 4 1. (1,0,0) 2. (1,1,0) 3. (1,1,1)
4, 3 1. (1,0,0,0) 6. (2,1,1,1) 11. (3,2,2,1) 16. (4,3,2,2)
2. (1,1,0,0) 7. (2,2,1,0) 12. (3,3,1,1) 17. (4,4,2,1)
3. (1,1,1,0) 8. (2,2,1,1) 13. (3,3,2,1) 18. (4,4,3,2)
4. (1,1,1,1) 9. (2,2,2,1) 14. (3,3,2,2) 19. (5,4,3,2)
5. (2,1,1,0) 10. (3,2,1,1) 15. (4,3,2,1)
4, 4 1. (1,0,0,0) 3. (1,1,1,0) 5. (2,1,1,1) 7. (2,2,2,1)
2. (1,1,0,0) 4. (1,1,1,1) 6. (2,2,1,1)
4,m ≥ 5 1. (1,0,0,0) 2. (1,1,0,0) 3. (1,1,1,0) 4. (1,1,1,1)
Table B-1: Minimal representations of different antiplurality committees
n,m Minimal w¯ for all Borda classes ErBw¯,3
3, 3 1. (1,0,0) 14. (3,3,2) 27. (5,4,3) 40. (8,6,3)
2. (1,1,0) 15. (4,3,1) 28. (7,4,1) 41. (9,6,2)
3. (1,1,1) 16. (5,2,1) 29. (6,5,2) 42. (8,7,3)
4. (2,1,0) 17. (4,3,2) 30. (7,5,1) 43. (8,6,5)
5. (2,1,1) 18. (5,2,2) 31. (6,5,3) 44. (10,7,2)
6. (2,2,1) 19. (5,3,1) 32. (7,5,2) 45. (11,7,2)
7. (3,1,1) 20. (4,3,3) 33. (8,5,1) 46. (9,7,5)
8. (3,2,0) 21. (5,4,1) 34. (6,5,4) 47. (10,8,3)
9. (3,2,1) 22. (6,3,1) 35. (7,5,3) 48. (11,8,2)
10. (4,1,1) 23. (5,3,3) 36. (7,6,2) 49. (11,9,3)
11. (3,2,2) 24. (5,4,2) 37. (8,5,2) 50. (13,8,2)
12. (3,3,1) 25. (6,4,1) 38. (7,5,4) 51. (12,9,7)
13. (4,2,1) 26. (7,2,2) 39. (7,6,4)
Table B-2: Minimal representations of different Borda committees
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n Minimal w¯ for all Copeland classes ErCw¯,m
and for all classes Erw¯,2 when r ∈
{
rA, rB, rP
}
and for all weighted voting games [q; w] with q = 0.5
∑
wi
3 1. (1,0,0) 2. (1,1,0) 3. (1,1,1) 4. (2,1,1)
4 1. (1,0,0,0) 4. (1,1,1,1) 7. (2,2,1,1)
2. (1,1,0,0) 5. (2,1,1,0) 8. (3,1,1,1)
3. (1,1,1,0) 6. (2,1,1,1) 9. (3,2,2,1)
5 1. (1,0,0,0,0) 8. (2,1,1,1,1) 15. (3,2,2,1,0) 22. (4,3,2,2,1)
2. (1,1,0,0,0) 9. (2,2,1,1,0) 16. (4,1,1,1,1) 23. (4,3,3,1,1)
3. (1,1,1,0,0) 10. (3,1,1,1,0) 17. (3,2,2,1,1) 24. (5,2,2,2,1)
4. (1,1,1,1,0) 11. (2,2,1,1,1) 18. (3,2,2,2,1) 25. (4,3,3,2,2)
5. (2,1,1,0,0) 12. (3,1,1,1,1) 19. (3,3,2,1,1) 26. (5,3,3,2,1)
6. (1,1,1,1,1) 13. (2,2,2,1,1) 20. (4,2,2,1,1) 27. (5,4,3,2,2)
7. (2,1,1,1,0) 14. (3,2,1,1,1) 21. (3,3,2,2,2)
6 see next page . . .
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5 . . . see previous page
6 1. (1,0,0,0,0,0) 36. (3,2,2,2,2,1) 71. (5,4,3,2,1,1) 106. (5,5,4,3,3,2)
2. (1,1,0,0,0,0) 37. (3,3,2,2,1,1) 72. (5,4,3,2,2,0) 107. (6,4,4,3,3,2)
3. (1,1,1,0,0,0) 38. (3,3,2,2,2,0) 73. (5,4,4,1,1,1) 108. (6,5,4,3,2,2)
4. (1,1,1,1,0,0) 39. (3,3,3,1,1,1) 74. (6,3,2,2,2,1) 109. (6,5,4,3,3,1)
5. (2,1,1,0,0,0) 40. (4,2,2,2,1,1) 75. (6,3,3,2,1,1) 110. (6,5,5,2,2,2)
6. (1,1,1,1,1,0) 41. (4,3,2,1,1,1) 76. (7,2,2,2,2,1) 111. (7,4,4,3,2,2)
7. (2,1,1,1,0,0) 42. (4,3,2,2,1,0) 77. (5,4,3,2,2,1) 112. (7,5,3,3,2,2)
8. (1,1,1,1,1,1) 43. (4,3,3,1,1,0) 78. (4,4,3,3,2,2) 113. (7,5,4,3,2,1)
9. (2,1,1,1,1,0) 44. (5,2,2,1,1,1) 79. (4,4,3,3,3,1) 114. (7,5,5,2,2,1)
10. (2,2,1,1,0,0) 45. (5,2,2,2,1,0) 80. (5,3,3,3,2,2) 115. (8,4,3,3,2,2)
11. (3,1,1,1,0,0) 46. (3,3,2,2,2,1) 81. (5,4,3,2,2,2) 116. (6,5,4,4,3,2)
12. (2,1,1,1,1,1) 47. (4,3,2,2,1,1) 82. (5,4,3,3,2,1) 117. (6,5,5,3,3,2)
13. (2,2,1,1,1,0) 48. (4,3,3,1,1,1) 83. (5,4,4,2,2,1) 118. (7,5,4,3,3,2)
14. (3,1,1,1,1,0) 49. (5,2,2,2,1,1) 84. (5,5,3,2,2,1) 119. (7,5,4,4,2,2)
15. (2,2,1,1,1,1) 50. (3,3,2,2,2,2) 85. (6,3,3,2,2,2) 120. (7,5,5,3,3,1)
16. (2,2,2,1,1,0) 51. (3,3,3,2,2,1) 86. (6,4,3,2,2,1) 121. (7,6,4,3,2,2)
17. (3,1,1,1,1,1) 52. (4,3,2,2,2,1) 87. (6,4,3,3,1,1) 122. (7,6,4,3,3,1)
18. (3,2,1,1,1,0) 53. (4,3,3,2,1,1) 88. (6,4,4,2,1,1) 123. (7,6,5,2,2,2)
19. (3,2,2,1,0,0) 54. (4,3,3,2,2,0) 89. (7,3,3,2,2,1) 124. (8,5,4,3,2,2)
20. (4,1,1,1,1,0) 55. (4,4,2,2,1,1) 90. (7,3,3,3,1,1) 125. (8,5,5,3,2,1)
21. (2,2,2,1,1,1) 56. (4,4,3,1,1,1) 91. (5,4,3,3,3,2) 126. (9,4,4,3,2,2)
22. (3,2,1,1,1,1) 57. (5,2,2,2,2,1) 92. (5,4,4,3,2,2) 127. (7,5,5,4,3,2)
23. (3,2,2,1,1,0) 58. (5,3,2,2,1,1) 93. (5,4,4,3,3,1) 128. (7,6,5,3,3,2)
24. (4,1,1,1,1,1) 59. (5,3,3,1,1,1) 94. (5,5,3,3,3,1) 129. (8,5,5,4,2,2)
25. (2,2,2,2,1,1) 60. (5,3,3,2,1,0) 95. (5,5,4,2,2,2) 130. (8,6,4,3,3,2)
26. (3,2,2,1,1,1) 61. (6,2,2,2,1,1) 96. (6,4,3,3,2,2) 131. (8,6,5,3,3,1)
27. (3,2,2,2,1,0) 62. (4,3,3,2,2,1) 97. (6,4,4,3,2,1) 132. (9,5,5,3,2,2)
28. (3,3,1,1,1,1) 63. (5,3,3,2,1,1) 98. (6,5,3,2,2,2) 133. (7,6,5,4,4,2)
29. (3,3,2,1,1,0) 64. (4,3,3,2,2,2) 99. (6,5,3,3,2,1) 134. (8,6,5,4,3,2)
30. (4,2,1,1,1,1) 65. (4,3,3,3,2,1) 100. (6,5,4,2,2,1) 135. (8,7,5,3,3,2)
31. (4,2,2,1,1,0) 66. (4,4,3,2,2,1) 101. (7,3,3,3,2,2) 136. (9,6,5,4,2,2)
32. (5,1,1,1,1,1) 67. (5,3,2,2,2,2) 102. (7,4,3,2,2,2) 137. (9,7,5,4,3,2)
33. (3,2,2,2,1,1) 68. (5,3,3,2,2,1) 103. (7,4,4,2,2,1) 138. (9,7,6,4,4,2)
34. (3,3,2,1,1,1) 69. (5,3,3,3,1,1) 104. (7,4,4,3,1,1)
35. (4,2,2,1,1,1) 70. (5,4,2,2,2,1) 105. (8,3,3,3,2,1)
Table B-3: Minimal representation of different Copeland committees for m ≥ 2,
and of different antiplurality, Borda and plurality committees for m = 2,
and of different weighted voting games with a simple majority
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n,m Minimal w¯ for all plurality classes ErPw¯,m
3,m ≥ 3 1. (1,0,0) 3. (1,1,1) 5. (2,2,1)
2. (1,1,0) 4. (2,1,1) 6. (3,2,2)
4, 3 1. (1,0,0,0) 10. (2,2,2,1) 19. (4,3,2,1) 28. (5,4,3,1)
2. (1,1,0,0) 11. (3,2,1,1) 20. (4,3,2,2) 29. (5,4,3,2)
3. (1,1,1,0) 12. (3,2,2,0) 21. (4,3,3,1) 30. (6,4,3,2)
4. (1,1,1,1) 13. (3,2,2,1) 22. (4,4,2,1) 31. (6,5,3,2)
5. (2,1,1,0) 14. (3,3,1,1) 23. (5,2,2,2) 32. (6,5,4,2)
6. (2,1,1,1) 15. (3,2,2,2) 24. (4,3,3,2) 33. (7,4,4,2)
7. (2,2,1,0) 16. (3,3,2,1) 25. (5,3,3,1) 34. (7,6,4,2)
8. (2,2,1,1) 17. (4,2,2,1) 26. (5,3,3,2)
9. (3,1,1,1) 18. (3,3,2,2) 27. (5,4,2,2)
4,m ≥ 4 1. (1,0,0,0) 10. (2,2,2,1) 19. (4,3,2,1) 28. (5,4,2,2)
2. (1,1,0,0) 11. (3,2,1,1) 20. (4,3,2,2) 29. (5,4,3,1)
3. (1,1,1,0) 12. (3,2,2,0) 21. (4,3,3,1) 30. (5,4,3,2)
4. (1,1,1,1) 13. (3,2,2,1) 22. (4,4,2,1) 31. (5,4,4,2)
5. (2,1,1,0) 14. (3,3,1,1) 23. (5,2,2,2) 32. (6,4,3,2)
6. (2,1,1,1) 15. (3,2,2,2) 24. (4,3,3,2) 33. (6,5,3,2)
7. (2,2,1,0) 16. (3,3,2,1) 25. (5,3,3,1) 34. (6,5,4,2)
8. (2,2,1,1) 17. (4,2,2,1) 26. (4,4,3,2) 35. (7,4,4,2)
9. (3,1,1,1) 18. (3,3,2,2) 27. (5,3,3,2) 36. (7,6,4,2)
Table B-4: Minimal representations of different plurality committees
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